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Carillion: Building on Shaky Ground 
Carillion plc’s (Carillion) rapid and unexpected collapse led to it filing for bankruptcy in January 
2018. Its failure raised uncomfortable questions about the role of those expected to adopt a more 
critical stance, including the Board, the auditors, the Regulators and the government1.  
The company went from a clean audit opinion and proposing a record dividend of £79.3m (FY 2016) 
in March 2017 to announcing a provision of £845m on contracts by July2? And then, the provision 
was increased further to £1,045m in September3 2017, just two months later.  
At the time of its bankruptcy, Carillion owed around £2bn to its 30,000 suppliers and others who had 
traded with it.  In addition, it had around 43,000 employees and many more were dependent upon it 
through its supply chains and pension schemes. 
Many of its approximately 27,000 pension scheme members face an uncertain future as the 
government Pension Protection Fund was forced to take over the schemes. They will not receive their 
expected pensions.  
The government, one of its main customers was caught unaware and had to commit £150m to ensure 
continuity of public services.  
‘Investors seemed to know, people who worked for the company seemed to know, the only 
people who didn’t see what was happening were those who were paid to– the directors and 
the auditors of the company.’4 Rachel Reeves MP Chair of Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy Committee. (Oral evidence 22 February 2018) 
Were clues present in the company’s financial statements (Case Exhibit 1) or was the mounting crisis 
hidden from analysts and the public?  
Is it the case that corporate financial reporting is no longer a useful basis for decision-making (Lev, 
2018)? 
Background 
Carillion came into existence via a demerger from Tarmac in 1999. The split left the heavy building 
materials business within the Tarmac company, transferring construction services to the newly formed 
Carillion. Over the ensuing years Carillion expanded into the facilities management sector, growing 
through acquisition, purchasing its rivals including Mowlem (£350m 2006), Alfred McAlpine (£565m 
2008) and Eaga (£298m 2011) at a premium (Case Exhibit 2). Following a change in government 
policy related to feed in tariffs, the Eaga business was rationalised almost immediately.  In 2014 the 
proposed takeover of its nearest rival Balfour Beatty failed. Many of the UK acquisitions also 
involved taking on the legacy defined benefit pension schemes of those companies, thereby adding the 
cost of servicing the pension scheme obligations to the overall cost of acquisition. 
In 2016 the company’s work for the UK government represented 38% of its revenues5. Carillion 
focused on providing maintenance, facilities management, and energy services to buildings and large 
property estates, in public and private sectors; infrastructure services for roads, railways, and utility 
 
1 Intro to case FT.com (2.06 minutes) https://youtu.be/8vb3Cp1AH04 
2 Carillion plc, 2017, first-half trading update 10 July 2017 
3 Carillion plc, Financial results for the six months to 30 June 2017, 29 September 2017  
4 Q977  https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/work-and-
pensions-committee/carillion/oral/79121.pdf 
5 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmworpen/769/769.pdf p.8 
networks, with contracts including road and hospital construction and many strategic service contracts 
e.g. free school meals. 
Carillion reported its results through four business segments: support services, Public Private Projects 
(PPP), Middle East construction services, and construction services (excluding the Middle East). 
Divisional performance for 2015 and 2016 is shown in Case Exhibit 3. Support services comprised 
52% of revenue in 2016 and include facilities management, facilities services, energy services, rail 
services, road maintenance services, utilities services, remote site accommodation services and 
consultancy businesses in the UK, Canada and the Middle East. PPP comprised 6% of revenue (2016) 
and includes returns on investments in PPP contracts in the UK and Canada and the sale of 
investments in those projects. The increase in revenues related to the construction phases of a number 
of projects, including the Midland Metropolitan Hospital, Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route and 
Midlands Priority Schools Building Programme. The reduction in profit experienced in 2016 was 
reported as being expected to decline again in 2017 due to fewer sales of equity in PPP projects. 
Middle East construction services comprised 13% of revenues in 2016 and 2% of operating profit 
with the company reporting a competitive market and low level of contracts available. Finally, 
construction services outside of the Middle East grew to 29% of revenues yet only yielded 3% 
operating profit. This segment includes the results of the UK building, civil engineering and 
developments business along with construction activities in Canada. 
Triggering Carillion’s decline 
Events were set in motion when Emma Mercer, at the time group finance officer, questioned the 
revenue recognition on construction contracts in March/April  2017. She had recently returned from 
time at the Canadian operation.  
Emma Mercer: Having a number of construction projects means that you have to exercise 
judgment over all sorts of things: when the contract is going to get finished; how much we are 
going to receive; if we are claiming against anybody; what entitlement we may have. What I 
saw when I returned to the UK is that both the number of contracts we were taking judgment 
on and the size of those judgments had increased. What that meant is that when we saw the 
deterioration in the first part of 2017 and into the second—when we saw those huge 
deteriorations on those contracts—because we were already at a more aggressive position, it 
was very difficult to withstand those deteriorations on those projects.6 (Oral evidence 6 Feb 
2018) 
On 10 July 2017 a £845m impairment was reported in the construction services division, of which 
£375m7 related to three loss making UK PPP contracts including the Royal Liverpool hospital, the 
Sandwell Midland Metropolitan hospital, the Aberdeen bypass and £470m to overseas markets. The 
Chief Executive Richard Howson resigned on release of the news. A further profit warning in 
September 2017 led to another £200m impairment to support services contracts8 and yet another profit 
warning in November 2017 indicated that Carillion was set to breach its bank covenants with 
expected average debt for the year to be between £875m and £925m9. A recapitalisation was planned 
for early 2018 to shore up the balance sheet, however the company entered liquidation on 15 January 
2018. A significant proportion of the company’s income was derived from long term contracts which 
involves significant reliance on the forecast costs by the company10. Under the accounting standard in 
 
6 Q272  http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/work-and-
pensions-committee/carillion/oral/78103.pdf 
7 Carillion plc, 2017 first half trading update, 10 July 2017 
8 Carillion plc, Financial results for the six months ended 30 June 2017, 29 September 2017 
9 Carillion plc, Update on discussions with stakeholders, trading and financial covenants deferral, 17 November 
2017 
10 Carillion plc, 2016 Annual Report, Accounting policies p.95 
operation at the time (IAS 11 Construction Contracts)11 contract revenues and costs were recognised 
by reference to the stage of completion where the outcome could be reliably estimated. This 
estimation of the final outcome involved significant judgement and was noted as a key audit risk in 
the 2016 auditor report (Case Exhibit 4). Contract revenue for 2016 amounted to £1,939.2m (37% 
annual revenues). 
Contract accounting processes were monitored internally in two ways by Carillion: 
- Monthly review meetings where management reviewed the position reported 
- Peer review process to challenge all aspects of the contract operation and reporting process 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee reported that when Deloitte examined peer reviews undertaken 
between January 2015 and July 2017 of the contracts that comprised the £845m provision that they 
had found that management had used higher expected margins than the peer review had advised in 
42% of cases. For example, the difference on the Royal Liverpool University Hospital contract meant 
that the 2016 accounts recognised £53m more than was recommended by the peer review12. In 
contrast, in just 14% of cases a higher margin was recommended as part of the exercise. 
It was later found that Carillion had also recognised revenues classed as ‘traded not certified’. This 
means that the clients had not yet agreed the costs e.g. in the case of claims or variations and therefore 
that there was significant uncertainty whether payment would be received. This figure was not 
publicly disclosed but was uncovered in the audit committee papers accessed by the joint committee13. 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee found that in December 2016 there was £294m of traded not 
certified revenue or 15% of contract revenues.  
The legacy of Carillion’s acquisitive strategy 
The acquisition spree led to a significant level of goodwill on the balance sheet (£431m from 
Mowlem acquisition, £615m from Alfred McAlpine acquisition and £329m from Eaga acquisition) 
comprising around 31% of total assets (2016). This goodwill exceeded the purchase price for these 
entities.14 The audit report identifies goodwill as a key area of judgement where small changes to the 
valuation assumptions could result in a significant reduction in the valuation of goodwill (Case 
Exhibit 4). 
Accounting for goodwill on acquisition is an accounting technique which can lead to significant 
intangible assets reported by acquisitive companies. The accounting rules have varied over time as 
various drawbacks of each approach have been identified (Amel-Zadeh, et al., 2016).  The current 
accounting standard (IFRS3) involves significant assumptions applied by management in relation to 
the future cash generation of the assets. In 2020 the International Accounts Standards Board (IASB) 
reopened the discussion by issuing a consultation paper15indicating that the discussion regarding the 
utility of the current accounting disclosures continues. 
The Parliamentary joint committee (Peter Kyle MP) questioned investors (Murdo Murchison 
Chairman Kiltearn Partners) about their treatment of goodwill in their analysis of the company. 
Peter Kyle: Did not the huge amounts of goodwill give you cause for concern?  
Murdo Murchison: We always look at goodwill. We invest globally and our typical approach 
to goodwill is to basically discount it quite heavily. Goodwill is typically the result of past 
 






management actions to overpay for assets and we saw that clearly here with McAlpine, for 
example. The question then is: is the market paying up for that goodwill? Again, it was 
discounted in the valuation. This is not a capital-heavy business. The goodwill in this case 
was not something we put a lot of weight on. In fact we discounted it very heavily’16(Oral 
Evidence 7 March 2018) 
As part of the quest to eliminate competitors from the market through acquisition Carillion had also 
acquired a number of defined benefit pension schemes. These schemes typically pay pensioners an 
amount linked to their salary and service over their period of retirement rather than being linked to 
their payments into the scheme. It is the employer, who bears the risk of changes in valuation and 
longevity of members. Whilst the schemes in question were closed to new members they have a long 
run off period and the liability must be valued and accounted for appropriately. 
By law, in the UK, defined benefit schemes must have sufficient assets to meet their liabilities17 and 
actuarial valuations should be conducted every three years to determine whether this is the case. 
Where it is not the case a deficit recovery plan must be agreed with the Pensions Regulator within 15 
months of the valuation which is expected to enable the sponsoring company to balance its 
operational cash requirements with its obligations to make good the pension scheme deficit.  
None of Carillion’s directors were members of these schemes, but they were shareholders and 
arguably prioritised their own interests (Case Exhibit 5) ahead of the scheme members and the legal 
responsibility to pensioners. Whilst the valuation risk was acknowledged the directors were not 
incentivised to reduce the liability. Ultimately the Pension Protection Fund covered the approximately 
£800-900m required to cover the reduced pay out threshold to pensioners of the schemes. This will be 
borne by levy payers over future years18. The Chair of the Joint committee questioned Carillion’s 
interim Chief Executive (Keith Cochrane): 
Chair: The point […] is that you are saying that it is all being paid out of cash, and yet the 
cash left in 2016 is minus £117 million. When it all went under, just a couple of weeks ago, 
you had at least a £587 million deficit—probably £800 million or £900 million—in the 
pension fund. Over a seven-year period, 2009 to 2016, you have paid out dividends of £554 
million. You have said very warm words about what an important stakeholder the pension 
fund was and how it really mattered, and you have talked about all of these conversations you 
had with the trustees, and yet—this was just a matter of fact—you were paying out much more 
in dividends, were you not, than you were paying into the pension fund?  
Keith Cochrane: Certainly the quantum of dividends versus pension fund payments, 
absolutely. That is a statement of fact. I accept that.19 (Oral evidence 6 Feb 2018) 
Evidence of stress – using payables as a source of funding 
In addition, there was significant market evidence that Carillion was using its suppliers as a source of 
cash flow. It did so via an Early Payment Facility (EPF) through which it encouraged suppliers to take 
a discount on the payable in return for earlier payment (45 days) rather than its standard 120 days 
terms. This was despite the company signing the prompt payment code committing to 60 days 




17 The Pensions Act, 2004. 
18 https://www.ppf.co.uk/ 
19 Q 378 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/work-and-
pensions-committee/carillion/oral/78103.pdf 
‘signatories undertake to pay suppliers within a maximum of 60 days* (in line with late 
payment legislation requirements), to work towards adopting 30 days as the norm, and to 
avoid any practices that adversely affect the supply chain.’ 20  
This practice of using payables as a source of funding was reported in the trade press as early as 2013 
(Case Exhibit 6). The 2016 annual report’s only disclosure related to the EPF put a decidedly positive 
slant on the arrangement. 
‘The use of Carillion’s sector leading supply chain finance offering, our Early Payment 
Facility, allows our supply chain partners access to their payments ahead of their contractual 
terms, reducing their need for working capital and helping them grow and sustain local 
communities.’21 
The Joint committee inquiry (Heidi Allen MP) questioned Emma Mercer who was Finance Director at 
the time of the collapse about the scheme. 
Emma Mercer ‘Effectively, we give suppliers the choices of being on either. With those that 
go on to the supply chain factoring, we do ask them to sign up to terms of 120 days, but they 
have the ability to be able to draw down a payment within 45 days—which I will come back to 
in a second—or anything above 45 days is not at their charge. We get the benefit of the 
working capital facility associated with that up to 120 days.  
Heidi Allen: Does that mean that you were using suppliers like a loan? You were borrowing.  
Emma Mercer: The reason we introduced it is because when we went back to the Prompt 
Payment Code, and we went back to discussions on government contracts—and also on other 
contracts with our other customers as well—what we found was that we were being pushed to 
drive supplier days, obviously, down to 45 days, but our customers were not necessarily 
paying us on 45 days.’22 (Oral evidence 6 Feb 2018) 
The Usefulness of Financial Reporting 
The Carillion case has highlighted the seeming disconnect between the financial reports and the 
underlying performance of the company. The reporting did not provide insight into the aggressive 
accounting policies adopted nor the practices designed to grow revenues at the expense of 
profitability. 
Investors made their own adjustments for the purposes of analysis e.g. to goodwill on acquisition23. 
The Joint committee report also found that the company’s  
‘board minutes in April 2015 refer to ‘disappointing’ UBS analysis that had factored both the 
pension deficit and the EPF into Carillion’s total debt position. The May 2015 minutes state 
that the shorting (betting against) Carillion shares was up significantly and that the ‘bulk had 
followed the UBS note in March’’24  
 
20 http://www.promptpaymentcode.org.uk/ 
21 Carillion plc, 2016 Annual Report, p.13 
22 Q353/354 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/work-
and-pensions-committee/carillion/oral/78103.pdf 
23 Q 1093 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/work-and-
pensions-committee/carillion/oral/79969.pdf 
24 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmworpen/769/769.pdf p.16 
 
 
Investor adjustments to Carillion’s debt to take into account the EPF had started from as early as 2013 
(Case Exhibit 7), despite the company’s superficial disclosures on the matter (Case Exhibit 6).  
Whilst ignoring the mounting debt within the company and the large unfunded pension liability, the 
Board increased the dividends to shareholders to record levels maintaining a veneer of normality. The 
dividend policy led to investors purchasing the company’s shares on the promise of continued and 
increasing dividends rather than because of the long term value within the company. 
The board were heavily criticised by the Joint committee report for the lack of challenge by the non-
executive directors and the overly optimistic outlook of the Chairman, Philip Green.  
‘Carillion’s directors, both executive and non-executive, were optimistic until the very end of 
the company. They had built a culture of ever-growing reward behind the façade of an ever-
growing company, focused on their personal profit and success. Even after the company 
became insolvent, directors seemed surprised the business had not survived.’25  
  
 
25 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmworpen/769/769.pdf  p.47 
 
Case Exhibit 1: Carillion Accounts (extracts from Annual Reports) 
Consolidated income statement 
£m 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Revenue 4,402.8 4,080.9 4,071.9 4,586.9 5,214.2 
less share of JV -736.6 -748.3 -578 -636.2 -819.3 
Group  revenue 3,666.2 3,332.6 3,493.9 3,950.7 4,394.9 
Cost of sales -3,279.4 -2,984.6 -3,166.4 -3,609.8 -4,044.2 
Gross profit 386.8 348 327.5 340.9 350.7 
Admin expenses -240.4 -268.2 -166.4 -195.2 -217.8 
Profit on disposal of PPP equity investments 13.2 44.6 13.9 37.7 12.7 
Group operating profit 159.6 124.4 175 183.4 145.6 
Share of results of JVs 34.3 26.5 25.1 26 36.3 
Profit from ops 193.9 150.9 200.1 209.4 181.9 
Non operating items -1.2 -0.7 -9.9 -2.5 -1.1 
Net financial expense -27.9 -39.6 -47.6 -51.8 -34.1 
Profit before tax 164.8 110.6 142.6 155.1 146.7 
Tax -9.9 -4.3 -15.1 -15.7 -17.2 
Profit after tax 154.9 106.3 127.5 139.4 129.5 
      
Amortisation (note 3) 35.1 22.8 20.3 23 20 
Depreciation (note 3) 27.1 21.5 24.5 22.4 25 
 
Consolidated balance sheet 
 
£m 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Non current assets      
Property, plant and equipment 125.8 128.2 140.9 140.8 144.1 
Intangible assets 1,536.6 1,552.8 1,610.8 1,633.9 1,669.3 
Retirement benefit assets 0.7 3.8 6.1 12.7 5.8 
Investments in JVs 176.4 152 130.6 161.4 174.9 
Other investments 61.5 7.3 9.3 4.7 5.4 
Deferred tax assets 123.8 112.6 142.6 103.8 163.8 
Total non current assets 2,024.8 1,956.7 2,040.3 2,057.3 2,163.3 
      
Current assets      
Inventories 55.3 48.6 50.1 64.3 78.8 
Trade and other receivables 1111.5 1212.3 1325.4 1270.5 1664 
Cash and cash equivalents 657.1 413.7 472 462.2 469.8 
Derivative financial instruments 0.4 2.2 0 14.6 46.4 
Current asset investments 2.5 2.4 1.9   
Income tax receivable 10.8 4 0.7 1.2 10.8 
Assets classified as held for sale           
Total current assets 1837.6 1683.2 1850.1 1812.8 2269.8 
Total assets 3862.4 3639.9 3890.4 3870.1 4433.1 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Current liabilities      
Borrowing -35.3 -22.5 -35.3 -33.5 -96.7 
Derivative financial instruments -7.1 -13.2 -22.6 -11.6 -10.6 
Trade and other payables -1,614.6 -1,588.5 -1,727.1 -1,713.8 -2,090.1 
Provisions -27 -32.7 -8.6 -5 -7.8 
Income tax payable -3.8 -4.7 -8.3 -7.2 -12.2 
Total current liabilities -1,687.8 -1,661.6 -1,801.9 -1,771.1 -2,217.4 
      
Non-current liabilities      
Borrowing -777.6 -606.4 -614 -598.5 -592 
Other payables -9.1  -48.7 -64.4 -67.3 
Retirement benefit liabilities -351.7 -373.9 -515.8 -406.2 -810.6 
Deferred tax liabilities -16.3 -10.2 -11.3 -10.5 -15.4 
Provisions -9.2 -4.2 -4.2 -2.1 -0.5 
Total non current liabilities -1,163.9 -994.7 -1194 -1,081.7 -1,485.8 
Total liabilities -2,851.7 -2,656.3 -2,995.9 -2,852.8 -3,703.2 
Net assets 1,010.7 983.6 894.5 1,017.3 729.9 
 
Equity      
Share capital 215.1 215.1 215.1 215.1 215.1 
Share premium 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 
Translation reserve -23.8 -36.4 -33.3 -38.9 -0.9 
Hedging reserve -21.5 -5.6 -11.2 -8.2 -16.5 
Fair value reserve 15.8 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Merger reserve 433.2 414.6 400.9 393.7 389 
Retained earnings 358.9 358.1 279.7 410.3 92.7 
Equity attributable to shareholders of the parent 998.9 967.2 872.7 993.5 701.1 
Non-controlling interests 11.8 16.4 21.8 23.1 28.8 
Total equity 1,010.7 983.6 894.5 1,016.6 729.9 
      
Further data from the notes to the accounts      
Bank overdrafts -4.9 -3.3 -6.2 -6.4 -2.1 
Trade payables 643.3 541.9 611.6 591.4 749.2 
Trade receivables 236.1 219.7 242.1 252.8 229.5 
Average net borrowings 344.1 490.6 450.7 538.9 586.5 
Other creditors  263.1 404.6 509.5 561.2 760.5 
Proposed dividend per share (p) 18.45 18.25 17.75 18.25 18.45 
  
Consolidated cash flow statement 
 
£m  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Cash flow from operating activities       
Group operating profit  164.1 124.4 175 183.4 145.6 
Depreciation and amortisation  62.2 44.3 44.8 45.4 45 
Loss on disposal of property, plant and equipment  1.6 2.3 0.3 -14.4 -6.4 
Profit on disposal of PPP Equity investments  -13.2 -44.6 -13.9 -37.7 -12.7 
Other non cash movements  -10 -6.1 -1.7 -0.3 1.9 
 Non-recurring operating items  2.6 44.2   5 40.2 
Operating profit before changes in working capital  207.3 164.5 204.5 181.4 213.6 
       
Decrease in inventories  15.2 -1.1 -1.4 -14.3 -6.3 
(Increase)/decrease in trade and other receivables  -36.6 -123.8 -40.1 48 -290.6 
Decrease in trade and other payables  -143.5 -40.6 50.5 -41.1 301.5 
Cash generated from operations before pension recovery 
payments, rationalisation costs and Eaga related charges 42.4 -1 213.5 174 218.2 
Deficit recovery payments to pension scheme  -30.2 -39.2 -46 -47.4 -34.6 
Rationalisation costs  -28.6 -22 -11.5 -6.3 -46.6 
Eaga Partnership Trusts related charges  0       -21.5 
Cash (used in)/generated from operations  -16.4 -62.2 156 120.3 115.5 
Financial income received  15.8 11.1 2.9 2.4 2.5 
Financial expense paid  -27.3 -30.9 -29.6 -35.3 -39.6 
Acquisition costs  -0.6 -1 -1.2 -6.6 -0.9 
Taxation receipts/(payments)  2.9 4.6 -4.3 -7.5 -4.2 
Net cash flows from operating activities  -25.6 -78.4 123.8 73.3 73.3 
       
Cash flows from investing activities       
Disposal of property, plant and equipment  2.7 0.9 6.4 17.6 13.8 
Disposal of jointly controlled and other investments 45.9 143.7 36 54.1 47.1 
Dividends from jointly controlled entities  13.6 18.2 9.1 16.8 11.8 
Loan advance/repayments received from jointly controlled entities 2.9 15.9 7.2 2.1 
Disposal and closure of businesses  -3.8 -0.3    
Decrease in current asset investments  1.8 0.1 0.5   
Acquisition of subsidiaries (net of cash acquired)  -4.9 -20.3 -26.3 -10.6 -32.5 
Acquisition of non-controlling interests    -3.1   
Acquisition of intangible assets  -3.7 -6.5 -3 -1.2  
Acquisition of property, plant and equipment  -14.6 -21.6 -25.8 -29.2 -37.3 
Acquisition of equity in and net loan advances to jointly 
controlled entities -19.7 -6.1 -7.7 -28.3 -4.8 
Acquisition of other non-current asset investments  -3 -3.8 -1.2 -0.4   
Net cash flows from investing activities  14.3 107.2 0.8 26 0.2 
  
       
Cash flows from financing activities       
Draw down of bank and other loans  277.2 -171 14.7 -19 6.7 
Payment of finance lease liabilities  -16.8 -16.7 -9.2 -6 -7.4 
Acquisition of own shares  -3 -2.2 -0.5 -0.4 -1 
Payment to employees in settlement of share options -0.8 -0.3    
Dividends paid to equity holders of parent  -70.4 -74.6 -75.7 -76.8 -78.9 
Dividends paid to non-controlling interests  -8.2 -1.1 -1 -3.2 -3.8 
Net cash flows from financing activities  178 -265.9 -71.7 -105.4 -84.4 
       
Increase in net cash and cash equivalents  166.7 -237.1 52.9 -6.1 -10.9 
Net cash and cash equivalents at 1 January  487.7 652.2 410.4 465.8 455.8 
Effect of exchange rate movements  -2.2 -4.7 2.5 -3.9 22.8 
Net cash and cash equivalents at 31 December  652.2 410.4 465.8 455.8 467.7 





Case Exhibit 2 – Timeline 
 
 
























































Support services 2,534.2 55% 2,712.7 52%  
PPP projects 192.8 4% 313.0 6%  
Middle East construction services 601.6 13% 668.3 13%  
Construction services (Excluding Middle 
East) 
1,258.3 27% 1,520.2 29%  
Total 4,586.9  5,214.2   
      
Underlying operating profit £m % profit £m % profit  
Support services 146.6 6% 182.7 7%  
PPP projects 49.3 26% 28.3 9%  
Middle East construction services 25.3 4% 16.1 2%  
Construction services (Excluding Middle 
East) 
37.8 3% 41.3 3%  
Total 259.0 6% 268.4 5%  
 
Source: Carillion plc, 2016 Annual Report, p.38.  
Case Exhibit 4 – Principal audit risks (Audit Report extracts) 
  
‘The risk – The Group recognises revenue based on the stage of completion of construction contracts 
by reference to the proportion of costs incurred to the balance sheet date compared with the final costs 
of the contract at completion and therefore relies on estimates in relation to the final out-turn of costs 
on each contract. Changes to these estimates could give rise to material variances in the amount of 
revenue and margin recognised. Contingencies may also be included in these estimates of cost to take 
account of specific risks, or claims against the Group, arising within each contact. These 
contingencies are reviewed by the Group on a regular basis throughout the contract life and adjusted 
where appropriate. Finally, variations and claims are recognised on a contract-by-contract basis, both 
on service and construction contracts, where the Group believes the rights and obligations exist given 
the progress of negotiations. There is therefore a high degree of judgement in: recognising variations 
and claims; and estimating the revenue recognised by the Group based on the projected final out-turn 
on contracts.’ 
‘The risk – The Group’s balance sheet includes goodwill, principally arising from historical 
acquisition in the UK. The risk is that the goodwill allocated to cash generating units (‘CGU’) is not 
recoverable and should be impaired. Due to inherent uncertainty involved in forecasting an 
discounting future cash flows, which are the basis of the assessment of recoverability, this is one of 
the key judgemental areas for our audit. 
The Group annually carries out an impairment assessment of goodwill using a value-in-use model 
which is based on the net present value of the forecast earnings of the cash-generating-unit (‘value-in-
use’). This is calculated using certain assumptions around discount rates, growth rates and cash flow 
forecasts. 
Given the relative size of the goodwill in the Group balance sheet, particularly in the UK Services 
CGU, relatively small changes in these assumptions could give rise to material changes in the 
assessment of the carrying value of goodwill.’ 
Source: Carillion plc, 2016 Annual Report, p.86. 
 
  
Case Exhibit 5 – Extracts from Carillion plc 2016 Annual Report  
 Extract from dividend policy  
‘The Group has a progressive dividend policy which aims to increase the dividend each year in line 
with the growth in underlying earnings per share. The Board has adopted this policy in order to align 
shareholder returns with the underlying performance of the business. The Board has increased the 
dividend in each of the 16 years since the formation of the company in 1999.’ 
Extract form Carillion five-year review  











Case Exhibit 6 – Early payment facility (extract from Annual Report) 
 
 ‘As indicated above, our category management supply chain system is also helping us to create long-
term partnerships with our suppliers, as this system means we buy in greater volumes from our chosen 
suppliers who also get good visibility of our future requirements for the goods and services that they 
sell to Carillion. The introduction of Carillion’s Early Payment Facility (EPF) at the beginning of 
2013 has also proved to be extremely popular with suppliers and is also helping us to build long-term 
relationships with our suppliers. Under the EPF, we are paying all suppliers on at least the same terms 
as they were on prior to joining the EPF and in many cases we are paying suppliers up to 20 days 
earlier, at no cost to suppliers. Also suppliers can choose when they take payments in respect of 
approved invoices and if they wish to take them even earlier, they can do so at minimal cost, which is 
far less than their typical cost of borrowing.’ 
 
Source: Carillion plc, 2014 Annual Report, p.15  
Case Exhibit 7 – Carillion to double maximum payment terms to 120 days 
 
By Vern Pitt, Iain Withers, 21 March 2013 
Exclusive: Subcontractors will have to pay fee to get money before 120 days as part of new payment 
system 
Carillion is nearly doubling its maximum payment terms to suppliers to 120 days in a new payment 
system. 
Under Carillion’s Early Payment Facility, payment terms will rise from a maximum of 65 days to 120 
days and subcontractors will be paid directly by a bank instead of Carillion, through a controversial 
financial mechanism known as “reverse factoring”. 
Under the scheme, subcontractors will have to pay a charge to the bank if they want to be paid earlier 
than 120 days. The charge is set out on a sliding scale that increases to up to 0.67% of the value of the 
invoice, depending on how early the subcontractor wishes to be paid. 
A Carillion spokesman said the scheme was voluntary and Carillion would reimburse the cost of bank 
charges for payments made to subcontractors in line with their current payment terms, leaving them 
no worse off. He also said suppliers could negotiate with Carillion to cover a proportion of the fees for 
payment earlier than their current terms. 
But a Carillion subcontractor, who did not wish to be named, told Building he had serious concerns 
about the scheme and feared that the charges would not be covered by Carillion. “The subcontracting 
industry can’t afford it. This would mean that we wouldn’t be able to do business with Carillion - it’s 
that serious,” he said. 
He added that the scheme was too complicated to be properly understood - especially by smaller 
suppliers. “A lot of people will sign up for this out of desperation and later regret it, especially smaller 
contractors who don’t have commercial teams to advise them.” 
In a letter to suppliers, seen by Building, Carillion group finance director Richard Adam said the 
move was “in support” of the government’s Supply Chain Finance scheme - a form of reverse 
factoring - which was launched by David Cameron in October, primarily to support the cash flow of 
smaller firms within the supply chain. 
In documents alongside the letter, Carillion said it was a “mutually beneficial arrangement that 
provides earlier access to funds for our suppliers and a strong balance sheet for Carillion”. 
But Suzannah Nichol, chief executive of the National Specialist Contractors Council, said it was “in 
no way acceptable” to extend payment terms to 120 days, while the government put so much 
emphasis on prompt payment. 
She said although the scheme was voluntary, suppliers would feel pressured to accept new terms for 
fear of losing future work. “Many suppliers, certainly at this moment in time, find it difficult to stand 
up to main contractors,” she said. 
Rudi Klein, chief executive of the Specialist Engineering Contractors Group, advised firms to be 
careful before entering into such an arrangement. He pointed out that suppliers would still be left 
chasing Carillion for reimbursement of the bank charges. 
“This doesn’t improve supply chain finance, it underwrites the major fault line in UK construction, 
which is the under capitalisation of the largest firms that let out most of the work,” he added. 
In its accounts for the year to 31 December 2012 Carillion reported that its net debt - the balance of its 
cash in the bank minus its borrowings - increased by nearly 50% the previous year to £156m, with 
average debt through the year increasing by £125m to £344m. It also reported that it owed trade 
creditors £1.6bn.  
Kevin Cammack, analyst at Cenkos, who downgraded his share price expectation for Carillion this 
month, in part due to the firm’s low cash reserves, said that extending payment terms to 120 days 




Case Exhibit 8 – Accounting policy for construction contracts 
 
When the outcome of a construction contract can be estimated reliably, contract revenue and costs are 
recognised by reference to the degree of completion of each contract, as measured by the proportion 
of total costs at the balance sheet date to the estimated total cost of the contract. Insurance claims, 
incentive payments, and variations arising from construction contracts are included in revenue where 
it is probable that they will be recovered and are capable of being reliably measured.  
When the outcome of a construction contract cannot be estimated reliably, contract revenue is 
recognised to the extent of contract costs incurred where it is probable those costs will be recoverable.  
The principal estimation technique used by the Group in attributing profit on contracts to a particular 
period is the preparation of forecasts on a contract by contract basis. These focus on revenues and 
costs to complete and enable an assessment to be made of the final out-turn of each contract.  
Consistent contract review procedures are in place in respect of contract forecasting. When it is 
probable that total contract costs will exceed total contract revenue, the expected loss is recognised 
immediately. Contract costs are recognised as expenses in the period in which they are incurred.  
Where costs incurred plus recognised profits less recognised losses exceed progress billings, the 
balance is shown as amounts owed by customers on construction contracts within trade and other 
receivables. Where progress billings exceed costs incurred plus recognised profits less recognised 
losses, the balance is shown as amounts owed to customers on construction contracts within trade and 
other payables.  
Pre-contract costs Pre-contract costs are expensed as incurred until the Group is appointed preferred 
bidder or formal notification of the intention to appoint is received. Provided the contract is expected 
to generate sufficient net cash inflows to enable recovery and the award of the contract is probable, 
pre-contract costs incurred post the appointment as preferred bidder are included in amounts owed by 
customers on construction contracts. 
Where pre-contract bid costs are reimbursed at financial close, the proceeds are initially applied 
against the asset included in amounts owed by customers on construction contracts. Any excess 
recoveries are carried forward as deferred income and released to profit over the period of 
the contract. 
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